17 research outputs found

    Design and scheduling of periodic review kanban systems

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    Ankara : Department of Industrial Engineering and Institute of Engineering and Sciences, Bilkent Univ., 1997.Thesis (Master's) -- Bilkent University, 1997.Includes bibliographical references leaves 107-112In the last years, the term just in-time (JIT) has become a common term in repretitive manufacturing systems. It can be defined as the ideal of having the necessary amount of material available where it is needed and when it is needed. One of the major elements of JIT philosophy and pull mechanism is the Kanban system. This system is the information processing and hence shop floor control system of JIT philosophy. In this study, we propose an algorithm to determine the withdrawal cycle length, kanban size and number of kanbans simultancously in a periodic review Kanban system under multi-item, multi-stage, multi period modified flowline production setting. The proposed algorithm considers the impact of operating characteristics such a.s scheduling and actual lead times on design parameters.Erhun, FeryalM.S

    The NGO's Dilemma: How to Influence Firms to Replace a Potentially Hazardous Substance

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    We study a nongovernmental organization's (NGO's) decisions when it attempts to remove a potentially hazardous substance from commercial use in a market with competing firms. Specifically, we determine under what market and regulatory conditions an NGO should target the industry versus the regulatory body to influence firms to replace the substance. We examine how the NGO's strategy changes as the NGO's pragmatism (i.e., the extent to which the NGO incorporates firms' profits into its decision making) increases. Our results demonstrate that when the NGO is less pragmatic, it should examine the existing market structure to determine whether to target the industry or the regulatory body. However, as the pragmatism of the NGO increases, the NGO should increasingly leverage the competition between firms to ensure that a replacement is available to consumers. We examine multiple extensions including varying the competition dynamics, the NGO targeting both the industry and the regulatory body, the time discounting of replacement costs, and a firm potentially lobbying to counteract an NGO's activism. We show that the potential for a firm to lobby can benefit consumers by motivating the NGO to exert more effort and increase the market sensitivity to a substance, thereby forcing the firm to replace.National Science Foundation (U.S.) (Grant NSF/CAREER-0547021

    Aortic stenosis post-COVID-19: a mathematical model on waiting lists and mortality

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    Objectives To provide estimates for how different treatment pathways for the management of severe aortic stenosis (AS) may affect National Health Service (NHS) England waiting list duration and associated mortality. Design We constructed a mathematical model of the excess waiting list and found the closed-form analytic solution to that model. From published data, we calculated estimates for how the strategies listed under Interventions may affect the time to clear the backlog of patients waiting for treatment and the associated waiting list mortality. Setting The NHS in England. Participants Estimated patients with AS in England. Interventions (1) Increasing the capacity for the treatment of severe AS, (2) converting proportions of cases from surgery to transcatheter aortic valve implantation and (3) a combination of these two. Results In a capacitated system, clearing the backlog by returning to pre-COVID-19 capacity is not possible. A conversion rate of 50% would clear the backlog within 666 (533–848) days with 1419 (597–2189) deaths while waiting during this time. A 20% capacity increase would require 535 (434–666) days, with an associated mortality of 1172 (466–1859). A combination of converting 40% cases and increasing capacity by 20% would clear the backlog within a year (343 (281–410) days) with 784 (292–1324) deaths while awaiting treatment. Conclusion A strategy change to the management of severe AS is required to reduce the NHS backlog and waiting list deaths during the post-COVID-19 ‘recovery’ period. However, plausible adaptations will still incur a substantial wait to treatment and many hundreds dying while waiting

    Quality and entry deterrence

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    We analyze the role of quality, which we define as an attribute of a product that increases consumers' willingness to buy, as a competitive tool in a quality-price setting. We consider an incumbent's entry-deterrence strategies using quality as a deterrent when faced by a potential entrant. We investigate settings motivating the incumbent to blockade the entrant (i.e., prevent entry without extra effort), deter the entrant (i.e., prevent entry with extra effort), or accommodate the entrant (i.e., allow the entry to take place). We identify conditions under which the incumbent may actually over-invest in quality to deter entrance. More interestingly, we also identify conditions under which the incumbent may decrease his quality investment to make it easier for the entrant to penetrate the market. Our model sheds light on entry scenarios of particular platform product markets such as the entry of Xbox to the video game console market

    Quantity Discounts Under Demand Uncertainty

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    To motivate buyers to increase their order quantity, suppliers often rely on a well-established and widely used approach--they offer quantity discounts. This practice is in large part driven to obtain improved economies in transportation through higher truckload utilization. Recently, transportation rates, which are increasing faster than other costs, have become a larger portion of total net landed cost, placing the traditional quantity-discount practices under scrutiny. Many suppliers are left perplexed as to why their approach is not effective anymore, and some are even concerned that their overall profits may have actually decreased due to their discount parameters. In this paper, we study a multiperiod model, with a buyer facing stochastic end-item demand and a supplier offering an all-units quantity discount to him, to understand better the dynamics of such systems. We provide guidelines and insights on how to set effective discount parameters, and when not to expect much from them. We derive the optimal policy of the buyer, develop insights as to why the policy is complex, study the supplier's profit as a function of her offered quantity-discount scheme (accommodating the buyer's optimal policy), and discover a new phenomenon that is distinct and structurally different from the well-known bullwhip effect.all-unit quantity discounts, inventory management, stochastic demand, periodic review policies, minimum-order quantity

    Undergraduate Operations Research Prize

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